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Abstract
From 16 October to 8 December 1950 Victorian members of the Australian Railways Union
(ARU) and the Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (AFULE) stopped work. 
This was the longest railway strike in Victorian history. This article draws on the records of the 
Victorian railways and unions to explain this unusual strike in which for a time Labor ‘true 
believers’, Communists and even railways management found a common foe in the Australian 
arbitration system.
From 16 October to 8 December 1950 Victorian members of the Australian Railways Union (ARU) 
and the Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (AFULE) stopped work. This was 
the longest railway strike in Victorian history. During this period there were rail stoppages in 
every state except Western Australia in support of the Victorian workers.
This was a different strike from the great industrial battles of the late 1940s. These strikes had 
pitted Communist unions against employers, governments and often non-communist unions. For 
much of the 1950 strike, unions of different political ideologies cooperated. The Victorian 
railways as the employer had consented to the union’s claim in an early example of what would 
later be called 'enterprise bargaining'. A conservative government largely ignored the strike. The 
strike anticipated the crisis that the Victorian Railways, the great ediƓce of nineteenth-century 
state socialism, would face in the afƔuent and consumerist years of the long boom.
The railways in crisis
The Victorian railways strike of 1950 | PROV
In post-war Australia, the managers of the state railway systems faced difƓcult challenges. The
private afƔuence of a boom economy constrained the public sector. Road transport encroached
on the railways’ passenger and freight business. Years of expenditure restraint during the
Depression and wars left railways infrastructure chronically depleted. Full employment meant
that the old railways promise of a secure job was less attractive. The Victorian Railways refused
to pay above the award rate set by the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.
However, private employers frequently paid workers above the award rate, so that railway
workers with rail-speciƓc skills, such as drivers, were particularly disadvantaged compared to
skilled workers in the private sector. By June 1950, the Victorian Railways were short of 4,500
staff. Immigrants, in particular Displaced Persons, helped to cover staff shortages but many of
them left the railways as soon as their contracts had expired.[1]
In 1950, three commissioners headed by Chief Commissioner Richard Wishart managed the
Victorian Railways. Wishart had spent his entire working life of more than 40 years in the railways
and had been a commissioner since 1940.[2] The stability of railways management contrasted
with the volatility of Victorian politics, from September 1943 to June 1950 the Premiership
changed hands six times. In June 1950, Alexander McDonald of the Country Party formed a
government based on Labor support. Victoria had a Minister for Transport, however the
incumbents generally deferred to the commissioners. The ministers’ correspondence Ɠles bulge
with replies to other Members of Parliament in which the minister advised that the
commissioners were unable to accede to their requests.[3]
Arbitration and the railways
Railway management found workers more troublesome than politicians. From the early twentieth
century, rail unions looked to the Arbitration Court as a balance against the paternalistic style of
their managers. In 1924, the Arbitration Court made its Ɠrst award for railway employees.[4] In
1950, conditions of most railway employees were set out in the Railway and Tramway Employees
Award 1947 and the Locomotives Enginemen’s Award 1948. These awards speciƓed slightly
different conditions by state but the expectation of arbitrators and employers was that
signiƓcant alterations in any one state would Ɣow on to workers in other states.[5]
In the era of post-war full employment the attitude of unions towards the arbitration system
underwent a signiƓcant change. Unions now enjoyed a strong bargaining position and across the
political spectrum they chafed under the legalistic procedures and slow pace of industrial
arbitration. In 1947, the ChiƔey Labor government pleased all unions, both conservative and
radical, when it reformed the arbitration system to give most responsibilities to lay conciliation
commissioners rather than judges. In 1950, Commissioner Leslie P Austin was responsible for
locomotive crews, tradesmen, assistants and workshop staff and Commissioner Vivian G Hall for
the rest, except senior staff. Hall was a former industrial ofƓcer for the NSW railways, Austin a
former NSW president of the Australian Railways Union (ARU). New South Wales railway unions
had welcomed their appointment.[6] During the 1950 strike however both, especially Hall,
defended the sanctity of arbitration law against the emerging reality of collective bargaining in a
full-employment economy.
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Railway unionism
With 14,000 members, the Australian Railways Union (ARU) was the largest union in the Victorian
Railways. It represented most railway employees, excluding engine drivers and Ɠremen who were
members of the Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (AFULE) and those
covered by craft unions such as tradesmen in the workshops. The members of the ARU were
diverse by occupation and political allegiance. In 1942, Communist Party of Australia (CPA)
member, JJ Brown, became union secretary. Communist electoral success reƔected worker
approval of their record as industrial leaders. This leadership was most effectively displayed in a
nine-day strike in 1946, the Ɠrst railway stoppage in 43 years. The ARU’s industrial successes,
however, encouraged overconƓdence on the part of Brown. By 1950, his leadership was under
siege from supporters of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) Industrial Groups. These were
nominally a broad alliance of Labor supporters but were dominated by activists aligned with BA
Santamaria’s Catholic Social Studies Movement.[7]
The AFULE had only 2,000 members but they were the craft elite of the railways—drivers, and
those in the line of promotion to the position of drivers, such as Ɠremen. They were labour
aristocrats by disposition. In 1949, Frank Carey was elected Victorian secretary.[8] In 1950, the
union's national general secretary attributed the defeat of AFULE member Ben ChiƔey at the
1949 federal election to the fact that most voters were 'very lacking' in political understanding.
[9] The AFULE was closely aligned with the Labor Party: their national president Eli Harrison was
a federal Labor Member of Parliament from NSW. Neither Communists nor members of the ALP
Industrial Groups had a presence within the union, but there was a constant tension within the
Victorian branch between militants strongest in the metropolitan branches and more
conservative rural members.[10] This division was entrenched in the union’s structure. OfƓce-
bearers were elected by the Victorian membership as a whole, but the state executive comprised
only representatives of metropolitan branches.
The overtime issue
The catalyst for the strike lay in discontent among trafƓc branch employees: those who operated
the trains, enginemen, Ɠremen and guards. Staff shortages meant high levels of overtime for
these workers. In August 1950, metropolitan electric drivers worked 14 to 16 hours overtime a
fortnight.[11] TrafƓc branch employees had two demands. First, 'daily overtime' that penalty
rates commence after eight hours work on any shift and second, that for the determination of
when overtime started no distinction be made between time worked and 'passive time'; time
spent on the job without working, such as returning to a depot after taking a train to its
destination.
On Sunday 3 September, Brown led a guards’ deputation to interview the Railways
Commissioners. According to the ARU, the commissioners promised to 'approach the Arbitration
Court in agreement with the union' to provide for payment of all time on duty as active time and
payment of overtime on a daily basis after eight hours.[12] There was an ambiguity in the promise
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—were the commissioners agreeing to the union demands in good faith or were they simply
punting the matter to arbitration in the expectation that the commissioners would reject any
concessions? On Monday 18 September, a joint deputation of the ARU and AFULE met the
commissioners again. Wishart told them that the concessions offered to guards would also apply
to locomotive men subject to ratiƓcation by the Arbitration Court. Wishart now claimed that he
considered this unlikely.[13]
What lay behind the commissioners' insistence on arbitration? At times the ARU argued that
railways management was committed along with private employers and conservative politicians
to an anti-worker agenda.[14] This was incorrect. The Commissioners cherished the ideal of the
railways as a community. They had come to accept unions as part of the family. There was a
constant back and forth Ɣow of communication between unions and the Commissioners: 174
letters were despatched from ARU to railways management in 1950.[15] There were regular
meetings between unions and management on operational matters.[16] Railway management
came to accept arbitration as compatible with its formalised and bureaucratic style of
management. Railway managers were aware of the stresses on their workforce, especially in the
trafƓc branches, but wanted to respond to these within the framework of its established
management style.[17] Perhaps for this reason the 1950 strike itself has left relatively little trace
within the records of the Victorian Railways. The commissioners appear to have largely ceded
responsibility for the resolution of the strike to the arbitration system. This minimalist approach
was common among Australian employers of the time.[18]
Before the conciliation commissioners
For the Victorian Railways and the unions in 1950, the Arbitration Court meant Hall and Austin as
conciliation commissioners. They had power to vary the railway awards of 1947 and 1948, but the
Conciliation and Arbitration Act provided they could not adjust 'standard hours of work'.[19] The
question of whether changes to overtime rules fell under this heading would be contested during
the strike.
On Thursday 21 September Hall commenced his consideration of the agreement. The Victorian
Railways argued its support, but their case was opposed by representatives of other states. They
feared any variation would inevitably Ɣow on to their states. Hall was unsympathetic to the claim
and suggested that the Victorian Railways had acted under duress. He observed that railway
working conditions had substantially improved in recent years. Hall contended overtime rules
should recognise that the railways were necessarily an around-the-clock operation. He also
suggested that adjustments to passive time rules might be outside his powers. On 11 October
Hall handed down a decision that rejected the ARU’s claim.[20] Austin consulted with Hall and
similarly rejected the AFULE claim on the same day. He contended that it was outside his powers
to adjust hours of work.[21]
Hall and Austin’s decision exempliƓed the frequent determination of arbitration personnel in this
era to defy market forces and only grant concessions they considered appropriate. Assured of
government Ɠnancial support, state enterprises could hold the line on industrial law and order
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unlike private employers who frequently capitulated when workers struck in deƓance of
arbitration rulings.[22]
The Railway Commissioners’ response to Hall and Austin was to advise the unions on 14 October
that the September agreement would not be implemented. They also requested that Hall
convene a conference between themselves and the unions. This request began a long cycle of
unproductive arbitral hearings. All train services ceased from midnight on Sunday 15 October.
[23]
Hall’s decision evoked a strong response among railway workers. One indication was the position
of the AFULE. At stop work meetings on 16 October the Victorian branches of the AFULE voted 16
to 4 to continue strike action.[24] All ARU members, not just guards, were enthusiastic. By 19
October all ARU sections had voted to strike.[25]
Railway workers outside Victoria rallied to the cause. On 19 and 20 October in Brisbane the
AFULE federal convention, dominated by moderates, voted unanimously that the Victorian AFULE
remain on strike, that NSW and South Australian members stop work for 24 hours on Monday 23
October, and that there be a national stoppage of AFULE members on Monday 30 October if the
dispute was not resolved.[26] On Thursday 19 October, the NSW and South Australian ARU called
for 24-hour stoppages from midnight Sunday in support of the Victorian workers.[27] The NSW
ARU secretary, Jack Ferguson, was a ChiƔey loyalist and national ALP President. The NSW ARU
journal called for unity between Labor and Communist unionists in a just industrial struggle.[28]
The involvement of the NSW ARU in the strike reƔected not only a sense of solidarity with their
Victorian colleagues but also their own ongoing industrial grievances. For Ferguson, the spectre
of Communism was a useful tool to force concessions from the NSW Labor government. Even the
Victorian ARU Industrial Group pledged support for the strike. They sought to evade the fact of
the hostility of the conciliation commissioners to the strike. Instead the Industrial Group focused
on the conciliation cmmissioners’ doubts about their legal power to alter overtime rules.[29] At
an ARU members meeting on 26 October, Industrial Group activists proposed that an approach
be made to the Arbitration Court to settle this question. This suggestion attracted only 30 votes
out of 4,000.[30]
Railway workers’ enthusiasm for the strike, across state boundaries and ideological divisions,
reƔected their shared grievances. Outside of the railways there was less enthusiasm. Tramways’
Union members rejected calls from their Communist leadership for action in support of rail
workers.[31] The government relaxed restrictions on road trafƓc imposed to assist railways.[32]
Police were instructed to be lenient on overloaded road vehicles.[33] Despite this, food prices
rose and by late October coal shortages threatened industrial production.[34]
Where the rail unions did have some success was in blocking transportation alternatives for
commuters. Bus drivers were members of the Motor Transport Union and they agreed to restrict
emergency bus services operating directly to the city from 'outer suburbs'. The closest of these
to central Melbourne was Williamstown. Employers complained in early November that
abseentism among workers had risen to an average of Ɠve hours a week. The tram system was
massively overloaded. On 6 December, a journalist counted 130 passengers in one tram.[35] The
impact of this urban commuter frustration on a Country Party government was, however, limited.
The Victorian railways strike of 1950 | PROV
Railways management was bereft of a strategy to resolve the dispute. The decisions of
conciliation commissioners could not be appealed except on points of law. As a result, railway
management and unions sought to Ɠnd new ways of presenting again the September agreement
to Hall and Austin in the hope that somehow it could be ratiƓed. On the request of the Railways
Commissioners, Hall convened a compulsory conference of employer and union representatives
on 17 and 18 November. Such conferences were supposed to be an opportunity for the parties to
work towards an agreement, but the hearing was unproductive. Harrison, representing the
AFULE, told Hall he had discredited arbitration and played into hands of the Communists.[36]
Hall was unimpressed and his ruling on 20 October was peppered with homilies about the evils of
industrial appeasement.[37] Austin ruled the same day that the AFULE did not have an
agreement with the railways separate from that of the ARU. As a consequence, he determined
that the AFULE claim could not be granted independently.[38]
The response of railways management to the failed conference was to propose an appeal to the
Arbitration Court on the question of whether the unions’ claim constituted an alteration of
standard hours of work. A joint meeting of the ARU and AFULE executives on Friday 20 October
rejected this proposal and resolved to continue the strike.[39] On Monday, the ARU stopped work
in New South Wales and South Australia. In the latter state ARU members voted for an indeƓnite
strike in support of the Victorian colleagues and an outstanding local dispute.[40]
The strike had now become a national dispute and attracted the involvement of the Australian
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). The union peak council convened a conference of the 19 unions
with members in the railways. This met throughout the strike and I will refer to it as the 'unions’
conference'.[41] The ACTU leadership proposed a novel legal strategy to bypass Hall. This was to
pursue a 'Part 7 agreement'—an almost unused component of the Arbitration Act that provided
for automatic certiƓcation of an industrial agreement once lodged with the Arbitration Court’s
Industrial Registrar. These agreements were not subject to any review on public interest criteria.
In 1913, the High Court had restricted their scope for fear that they would be used to undercut
award conditions.[42] Now the Victorian railway unions sought to use them to exceed award
conditions. On 24 October, the ACTU unions’ conference resolved to pursue option of a Part 7
agreement. This followed a hint by Austin that day that neither he nor Hall had ruled out the Ɠling
of such an agreement.[43]
Railways’ representatives rejected the idea of a Part 7 agreement in negotiations with the ACTU
on 25 October. The railways argued that a Part 7 agreement was not arbitration. They suggested
Hall's proposal that such an agreement be made suggested a change of mind on his part as to
the unions’ claim. The railways proposed the claim be resubmitted for approval under Section 37
of the Arbitration Act. This provided for certiƓcation of industrial agreements subject to a public
interest test.[44]
On October 26, Hall and Austin summoned yet another conference to discuss the AFULE’s
national strike scheduled for Monday 30 October.[45] The conference commenced on that
Monday when trains stopped in all states except Western Australia, where the AFULE refused to
strike on the grounds it already had the conditions that the Victorian drivers sought.[46] Hall
accepted a submission from the railways that he could certify an agreement under Section 37
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even if the subject of the agreement, such as a change to standard hours, was outside his award-
making powers.[47] Hopes surged for an end to the strike and railways management claimed Hall
paved the way for a settlement.[48] The next day these hopes crashed. Hall once again rejected
the agreement and declared that nothing had changed to alter his judgement that ratiƓcation
would be against the public interest.[49] On Wednesday 1 November, government ministers,
railways and union representatives met at the Victorian Parliament. Premier McDonald declared
that the government would not give instructions to the Railways Commissioners and claimed a
Part 7 settlement was repugnant to the commissioners.[50]
The response of participants to Hall’s decision was to try yet another arbitral option. On 3
November, a meeting of government ministers, railways management and the ACTU agreed to
support the ARU in an approach to the Arbitration Court to ratify the September agreement. The
court ruled on 14 November that certiƓcation of the agreement was outside its power as it did
not concern any matters that had been left within the jurisdiction of the court by the 1947
amendments.[51]
The trial of strength
With the strike stalemated, railway management began to encourage a return to work. On
Monday 30 October, Wishart called for striking workers outside the trafƓc branch, to return to
maintenance duties. The commissioner argued this would ensure a quicker return to full
operation when the strike ended.[52] Railways management was cautious. Newly-arrived
Displaced Persons were sent to training courses rather than used as strike-breakers.[53] The
ARU leadership was anxious that support for the strike might erode outside of the trafƓc
branches. On 12 November, the union added a demand for general wage increases to its claims.
[54] By 20 November, Wishart claimed that a thousand members had returned.[55] The AFULE
remained solid.[56]
The success of the ARU in the nine-day day strike of October 1946 had cemented the appeal of
the Brown leadership to rail workers, but as the strike dragged on the union faced new
challenges. The militant mood of the immediate post-war years had passed. Strike pay was a
problem. Although some railway workers, such as tradesmen, could readily obtain skilled work,
those with more rail-speciƓc skills were in a difƓcult position.[57] The union’s insistence that
workers sign an afƓdavit that they were not in receipt of other income was resented. Claims of
political bias in allocation of strike pay and disputes about administration persisted for months
after the strike Ɠnished.[58]
Brown and his colleagues misjudged the position. His propensity for impulsive decision-making
had been the object of disapproval from his fellow Communists. His oratorical skills inspired
young radicals and mass meetings, but some Communists disparaged him as a 'tub-thumper'.
[59] As it is often the case in long strikes, the ARU leadership under siege began to lose touch
with its members.[60]
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At the Arbitration Court hearing of 14 November, Justice Foster had told unions that no
conceivable industrial gains could compensate for wages lost through strike action.[61] It is a
common argument against strike action, but misleading. In practice, one industrial victory,
however costly, makes it more likely employers will make concessions in the future.[62] Despite
this, by late November, militants in both unions made appeals to explicitly non-economic
motives for which the support of the rank and Ɠle was doubtful. Rail Strike News, produced by
the ARU-dominated Central Strike Committee, admitted that rail workers were making sacriƓces
to defend the wages of other workers.[63] At a late November AFULE executive meeting,
delegates clashed on this question. A moderate complained about workers’ loss of wages. A
militant responded: 'What is 70 or 80 pounds? Men go on holidays and throw it down the drain'.
[64] On 23 November, the Arbitration Court conƓrmed that unions with members on strike would
be excluded from an upcoming increase in the basic wage.[65] ARU and AFULE members outside
Victoria now faced a material cost.
The exhaustion of the arbitral road led the ARU to propose an extension of the strike. On 15
November, it proposed to the unions’ conference that black bans be placed on the delivery of oil
for road transport. The AFULE successfully opposed this proposal. The meeting did resolve that if
the dispute was not settled within a week, extension of the strike would be considered.[66]
The ARU leadership was unimpressed with the AFULE’s caution. Brown complained to AFULE
militants that Harrison and Carey were weakening in their resolve.[67] Brown should have
focused on his own union. The weakening base of his leadership was dramatically displayed at a
mass meeting of members held on Wednesday 15 November. In the morning, Industrial Group
members on the union executive had proposed a return to work.[68] An Industrial Group motion
to this effect at the meeting was ruled out of order by the chair of the meeting, ARU state
president GC Harding. Enraged Group supporters moved dissent, but Harding hastily declared
this motion lost and closed the meeting amidst uproar. Brown claimed Harding’s ruling was
upheld 3,000 to 4,000.[69] Industrial Group supporters claimed there was a two to one majority
against him.[70] The debacle exempliƓed the dogmatic and authoritarian style of many
Communists at the time.[71] It was a contrast with the AFULE meeting of the same day where a
thousand voted unanimously to remain on strike.[72]
The Ɠasco of 15 November accelerated the drift back to work by ARU members. By 20 November,
railways management claimed a thousand ARU members had returned.[73] This was despite the
fact that the ofƓcial policy of the ALP Industrial Groups remained that strikers should not return
as individuals.[74] On 16 November, South Australian ARU members voted to return to work in
deƓance of their union executive.[75] The Victorian ARU leadership retained the support of the
guards. They voted to remain on strike by 390 to 10 on November 19 and conƓrmed this decision
267 to 13 a week later.[76]
Arbitration once again
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The Arbitration Court ruling of 14 November made clear that the original agreement of
September was beyond retrieval. The strike seemed stalemated, but Hall and Austin now began
to suggest that the union claims might be revisited if and only if workers returned to work. On 22
November, Austin advised the ACTU he would recommence hearing the AFULE claim within 24
hours of a return to work.[77] The next day, the union’s federal council resolved that they did not
oppose acceptance of Austin's offer.[78] AFULE federal President Harrison allied himself with
the Victorian leadership to push for a return to work. They faced strong opposition from the
Victorian executive, which resolved the next day to recommend to branches that the strike be
continued.[79] On 26 November, branches voted 20 to 4 to continue the strike and city members
voted 891 to 44 to stay out.[80]
The AFULE’s public show of unity contrasted with the unravelling of the ARU. At a chaotic mass
meeting on 27 November, members rejected a recommendation from the union executive for a
partial return and instead voted 890 to 742 for a full return to work. Industrial Group supporters
argued that the only workers who beneƓted from the dispute were guards.[81] It was a massive
rebuff to the union leadership, but Brown insisted it was merely a recommendation for
consideration by the executive. The next day the ARU executive voted for a partial return to work.
In defence of this position, Brown argued that the wishes of the guards and the AFULE should be
taken into account.[82] Guards voted 265 to 5 to continue the strike on 30 November.[83]
The AFULE leadership was by now in full retreat. Harrison met with Premier McDonald, Labor
leader John Cain, Railways Commissioner Wishart and the Crown Solicitor on Tuesday 28
November. Harrison advised them that his union wanted to 'lose the tag' that tied its claim to
that of the ARU. Wishart suggested that Austin would be more sympathetic to the drivers’ claims
than Hall was to that of the ARU.[84] Harrison conveyed these hints to the union executive the
next day, but executive members voted to recommend to branches that the strike continue.[85]
Harrison’s response was to telegraph branch secretaries and argue that Austin’s offer should be
accepted. Despite this, a majority of branches backed the executive after heated debates at
meetings on Thursday.[86] AFULE militants complained that the ARU members who had voted for
a return were 'dirty rats'.[87]
The Victorian Government intervenes
It was at this point that the Victorian Government determined to act. Until this point ministers
had declared that the strike was not their concern and it was up to the Railways Commissioners
and the Arbitration Court to resolve the strike.[88] This caution was largely a result of its alliance
with the Labor Party, whose leader John Cain was of the centrist stamp of the AFULE ofƓce-
bearers. With the unions in disarray the state government now felt enabled to act.
On 4 December, the Victorian Cabinet resolved to instruct the Railway Commissioners to seek
deregistration of all branches of the AFULE and ARU under the Commonwealth Arbitration Act.
Premier McDonald also declared that the government might deprive rail workers of their rights of
superannuation and long-service leave.[89] The threat to retirement beneƓts would, as Carey
argued, have been devastating to those members of the AFULE with long service with the
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railways.[90] Deregistration would have enabled other unions to attempt to recruit ARU and
AFULE members. A particular danger here was the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR). This
small union originated in NSW as an organisation of strike-breakers during the 1917 general
strike and was detested across the spectrum of the labour movement. Advocates of a return to
work, such as Carey, stressed the danger that 'the SCAB NUR' posed.[91]
The response of the AFULE and ARU leaderships to the deregistration decision was to move
decisively to end the strike. On Tuesday 5 December, the AFULE Victorian president called an
emergency state conference for 11 am on Thursday in an attempt to bypass the militant majority
on the state executive.[92] On Wednesday, McDonald agreed to a request from Harrison to delay
the deregistration application until noon on Friday. The same day, an ARU deputation met the
Premier in discussions described as 'conciliatory'.[93] That evening Brown Ɣew to Sydney to
meet with Hall. The media predicted that Brown would support a return to work. A similar
judgment was made by the Commonwealth’s security services.[94] Hall now followed Austin in
the provision of encouraging words. On Thursday morning he declared that there were,
Around 1:30 pm on Thursday, Brown advised Hall that he would return to Melbourne and get the
guards to return.[96]
That morning, the AFULE special conference assembled. The claim that Brown had already
promised to Hall that the guards would return clinched the debate in favour of a return to work.
By now most workers could see no path to victory. Delegates voted 23 to 11 to end the strike,[97]
and, later that afternoon, guards accepted Brown's recommendation that they return to work.
[98] In public Brown and the rest of the ARU leadership claimed that Hall’s hints represented a
great victory, but some of his fellow Communists fretted about Brown’s bureaucratic style.[99]
The trains ran again on Friday 9 December, and[100] a grateful government paid a bonus to
tramway employees.[101]
Hall and Austin handed down their decisions on 24 January 1951. Hall once again refused the
ARU's claims for the abolition of passive time and overtime after eight hours duty. He presented
himself as the defender of Ɠscal responsibility against the commissioners. This decision was
greeted with outrage by the ARU who accused him of failing to honour the promise he had made
in settlement of the strike.[102] Austin's decision was more generous. He agreed to the abolition
of passive time prior to the commencement of work duties.[103]
Conclusions
certain merits in the claims that have been made and which appear to justify some
reasonable expectations on the part of the men. Obviously I can make no promises and I
make none. The case will proceed as soon as practicable after the men are back at work.
[95]
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On one level, the strike was an example of the failure of the arbitration system. The conciliation
commissioners did not conciliate in any meaningful sense, they arbitrated against the union. It
seems a classic example of how the old arbitration system discouraged direct negotiations
between workers and unions.[104] Despite this, Hall and Austin did perceive that the railways
faced a crisis. They were caught between declining demand for their services and rapidly rising
costs including wages. In the later 1950s arbitral authorities became more tolerant of workplace
bargaining, but the steady growth in wages added to rail losses. By the 1980s, huge deƓcits and
endemic industrial conƔict demoralised railway staff at all levels.[105]
For the Communist Party the strike was a heavy blow. The ARU leadership had worked closely
with the AFULE and the ACTU, despite its political disagreements with their leaderships. This
was a united front rather different from the sectarian hostility to the Labor Party that
Communists had displayed in the late 1940s. Brown argued in June 1950 that whatever the
political disagreements of rail workers they could Ɠnd common ground in defending their
material interests.[106] The strike revealed that this judgment was incorrect. Workers’
perception of their material interests is shaped by competing ideologies.[107] Over the next few
years the Communist leaders of the ARU lost to the Industrial Group candidates at union
election. Brown was in the last to fall in June 1954.[108] For the AFULE the strike was
disappointing, but its members’ sense of superiority was conƓrmed by their record of unity
during the strike compared to that of the ARU, despite the latter union’s more militant
pretensions.[109]
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